Trust and cooperative behavior: Evidence from the realm of data-sharing by Bauer, Paul C. et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Trust and cooperative behavior: Evidence
from the realm of data-sharing
Paul C. BauerID1☯*, Florian Keusch2☯, Frauke Kreuter2,3,4☯
1 Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany,
2 Department of Sociology, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany, 3 Joint Program in Survey
Methodology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, United States of America, 4 Institute for
Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* mail@paulcbauer.eu
Abstract
Trust is praised by many social scientists as the foundation of functioning social systems
owing to its assumed connection to cooperative behavior. The existence of such a link is still
subject to debate. In the present study, we first highlight important conceptual issues within
this debate. Second, we examine previous evidence, highlighting several issues. Third, we
present findings from an original experiment, in which we tried to identify a “real” situation
that allowed us to measure both trust and cooperation. People’s expectations and behavior
when they decide to share (or not) their data represents such a situation, and we make use
of corresponding data. We found that there is no relationship between trust and cooperation.
This non-relationship may be rationalized in different ways which, in turn, provides important
lessons for the study of the trust—behavior nexus beyond the particular situation we study
empirically.
Introduction
Is trust related to cooperative behavior? Social scientists have classically studied trust, conceptu-
alized as a mental state and measured as such, because they assume that high levels of trust
reflect a social reality in which people are more trustworthy and tend to cooperate more fre-
quently [1, 2]. The idea that trust is linked to cooperation dates back to the earliest works on
the concept [3, 4]. Only actors who trust each other should cooperate with each other, i.e.,
exchange information, resources, etc. Entering a cooperative relationship normally requires a
certain level of trust, and the same is necessary to sustain that relationship. Sometimes trust
scholars explicitly refer to the cooperation argument to defend their research, sometimes they
implicitly assume it [5, 6]. However, to this day scholars debate whether such a link actually
exists [7]. Our study is motivated by this debate and our contribution is three-fold.
First, we review past contributions to this debate as well as evidence that links trust to coop-
eration [7, 8]. Most of the respective findings stem from laboratory experiments, since here
cooperation can be observed in a controlled environment. However, even among scholars
pursuing lab experiments, debates ensued on how such lab experiments would need to be
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constructed so that the observed behavior could be regarded as cooperative behavior that is
caused by trust. We show that current evidence can be interpreted much more meaningfully
after having clarified certain conceptual issues. For instance, it makes a difference whether we
measure “generalized trust” or trust, i.e., what can also be called situational or specific trust
[9–11].
Second, we critically review this evidence and contrast it with an ideal experiment, i.e., a
design one would choose to study the relationship between trust and cooperative behavior if
there weren’t any practical or ethical constraints. This approach emphasizes various aspects
that were either not highlighted at all or at least underemphasized in previous research. Impor-
tantly, it produces some new arguments on why previous evidence regarding this question is
so mixed and suggests that the ideal—even if not attainable—may still provide a useful
benchmark.
Third, after providing an overview of the limitations that characterize current evidence con-
necting trust and cooperative behavior, we present findings from a survey in Germany. For
our study we identified a “real situation” that would allow us to observe both trust and cooper-
ative behavior. A corresponding situation is when people share, i.e., entrust their data to oth-
ers. In studying this situation we also contribute to a growing body of literature that
investigates attitudes towards data sharing and data sharing behavior in modern digital socie-
ties [12–14].
Section 2 provides conceptual clarifications that are helpful in the discussion of trust and
cooperation and presents an ideal setting of how our question would be studied without con-
straints. Section 3 summarizes and evaluates evidence on our research question that has been
collected so far. Section 4 presents our methodological approach. Section 5 presents the results,
which are summarized and discussed in the conclusion in Section 6.
Theory, hypothesis and ideal experiment
There is relatively wide interdisciplinary agreement that trust describes a psychological state
[15]. More specifically, trust can be defined as a truster A’s (probabilistic) expectation that a
trustee B will display behavior X in situation/context Y [5, 16–18]. The fact that A prefers behav-
ior X over some other behavior differentiates trust from a mere expectation. Thus, in contrast
to generalized trust aka social trust aka cross-situational trust [17]—a generalized, situation-
independent expectation—trust describes expectations that are tailored to situations. To clarify
that trust and generalized trust are two different concepts, scholars often attach the qualifica-
tion situational or specific to the former [17].
Cooperation, in turn, describes situations in which an individual willingly acts in a manner
that contributes to the others’ welfare [19, 20]. In other words, a truster engages in cooperative
behavior when she acts in a way that benefits the trustee or both. The cooperative behavior
studied in the experimental literature is usually the truster’s behavior in the trust game [8, 21].
To make a clear conceptual distinction between trust and behavior, scholars sometimes call
the latter trusting behavior. At the same time trusting behavior was rarely defined in relation
to trust. For instance, it could be defined as behavior motivated by a particular level of trust
rather than by other motivations [22].
Trust and cooperation have been studied across a diverse set of situations. In some situa-
tions, the trustee category may comprise specific persons (e.g., the best friend); in other situa-
tions, it may comprise more abstract categories (e.g., a stranger). For instance, Uslaner (1999)
describes situations that involve trusting strangers, e.g., a fruit seller who does not attend to his
stall in person but rather trusts strangers to pay by putting the correct amount into a locked
mailbox [23]. While the trustees in such situations are strangers unknown to truster A, it is
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very likely that, in real life, individuals make certain assumptions about who will be among
those strangers, what their values are, what profession they pursue, etc.
Generally, it is assumed that a truster A’s cooperative behavior in such a setting is deter-
mined by A’s expectation of B’s cooperation. In other words, it is hypothesized that there is a
positive relationship between trust and cooperative behavior. We review empirical evidence
regarding this hypothesis in Section 3. It is mixed and we provide arguments for why this is
the case.
Borrowing from the idea of ideal experiments [24], we may discuss how we would ideally
set up a study to investigate the link between trust and cooperative behavior. Social scientists
assume that trust is linked to cooperative behavior across a wide variety of situations, e.g.,
trusting public officials to be sincere about their campaign promises [25], trusting a seller in a
market (e.g., buying a used car) [26], trusting a political party when voting [27], trusting some-
one to keep one’s data secure [28], or trusting strangers to return one’s wallet [10]. Hence, we
would ideally observe and measure trust and cooperation across a wide variety of such situa-
tions. In other words, we would follow a randomly sampled group of individuals through their
life, and as soon as one of our individuals enters a trust situation, we would measure her trust
level (ideally through accessing her thoughts unobtrusively), i.e., her expectation of whether B
cooperates, and whether she actually chooses to cooperate herself. Additionally, we would col-
lect various situational parameters, e.g., A’s and B’s background characteristics, the behavior
that A expects of B, the time, the place, etc. As a consequence, we would end up with many
data points both on trust and cooperative behavior allowing us to study the trust—cooperation
link across a wide variety of situations. Additionally, we could design a randomized interven-
tion in which we try to manipulate people’s trust.
This ideal scenario is unattainable, which leaves us with two strategies. A first strategy is to
study hypothetical situations. Here, we describe situations to individuals, query them what
their expectation would be in those situations and ask them whether they would cooperate or
not. It is possible to do so in a standardized way across many individuals. While we can learn a
lot from such an approach [26, 29], we remain in the realm of hypothetical situations, whose
relation with reality is not entirely clear [30]. In other words, we only ask individuals how they
would behave, but don’t observe whether they actually really behave in this way.
A second strategy is to try to find real situations in which we can measure both individuals’
trust and their cooperative behavior. Since we are unable to attach ourselves to individuals and
follow them through their life, we have to identify specific situations where we are able to
observe them or create such situations ourselves. A survey or a lab experiment in which we
query individuals’ expectations and subsequently observe a real decision—as opposed to a
hypothetical decision—belongs to this latter category. Naturally by choosing this latter
approach, we can still debate on how behavior in that particular situation generalizes to behav-
ior in other situations.
Previous evidence and insights
The relationship between trust and cooperation has been examined across a series of studies.
The setting most commonly chosen is the lab experiment that allows researchers to survey par-
ticipants’ expectations and observe their behavior in a controlled environment. Interpreting
corresponding evidence is challenging insofar as measures and experimental protocols vary.
At the same time, slight variations thereof may strongly influence the results. Below, we review
a set of influential studies in this debate and discuss some critical aspects.
Glaeser et al. (2000) was one of the first studies to investigate the trust—behavior link, trig-
gering a series of other studies, among other things, because of its controversial result [7]. The
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authors measure trust as well as cooperation among Harvard students using different self-
report and behavioral measures. Cooperation is measured through the amount sent in the
‘classic trust game’ [31] and the reservation value (i.e., the value that subjects place on an enve-
lope) in an envelope drop experiment as well as through questions about past trusting behav-
ior. Measures of (generalized) trust encompass survey questions included in the General Social
Survey (GSS), the Faith-in-People Scale [32], and the Interpersonal Trust Scale [25]. Casting
doubt upon research based on measures such as the most-people question, Glaeser et al. (2000,
813) find that self-report measures of past trusting behavior are better than the abstract attitu-
dinal questions in predicting subjects’ experimental choices. These results were later supported
by evidence from Brazil [33].
Fehr et al. 2002 integrate measures of both trust and cooperation in a survey among 442
Germans [8]. The authors rely on classic self-report trust measures from the General Social
Survey to measure trust. Cooperation is measured through integrating a behavioral experi-
ment (modified trust game) in the survey relying on the strategy method. We refer the reader
to Fehr (2002) for an explanation of the latter. Like [7], Fehr et al. 2002 find that questions
about past trusting behavior predict trusting behavior, but unlike [7], they also find that a sur-
vey measure of generalized trust predicts behavior. However, more specific measures of trust
in the family, the neighborhood, the police, the courts, etc. do not predict behavior. When con-
trolling for more concrete expectations about the amount that will be returned, the effect of
generalized trust becomes insignificant. This seems in line with our argument in the previous
section, namely that the effect of generalized trust runs through more concrete trusting
expectations.
Ga¨chter et al. (2004) investigate a sample of 630 participants from rural and urban Russia,
students and non-students [34]. They measure cooperative behavior in a one-shot public
goods game (PGG) and trust with survey questions afterwards. While they don’t find an effect
for the GSS trust measure, they find an effect for the GSS trust index, a combination of three
questions on contributions in the PGG. Their findings contradict [7], that measures trusting
behavior in the trust game, and [35], that finds no effect of the GSS index on behavior in the
prisoner’s dilemma. The effect of the GSS index seems to be due to the GSS fair and GSS help
questions, once the index is decomposed [34]. Moreover, the authors find that trust in strang-
ers has a statistically significant effect on trusting behavior as measured with a behavioral mea-
sure, while a self-report trusting behavior index shows no relationship with trusting behavior.
Bellemare and Kro¨ger (2007) measure trusting behavior within a Dutch sample of 499 par-
ticipants [36]. Trust is measured through a question querying past experiences when trusting
others, cooperative behavior through an investment game. Theirs is not a direct measure of
trust, rather of past experiences, and the authors find no significant effect on social capital
investments, i.e., cooperation. Interestingly, however, Bellemare and Kro¨ger (2007, 187) also
query participants for their prior subjective expectations of the average amount which will be
sent in the experiment as well as ask respondents to state how much they thought of receiving
from senders. These expectations correlate with the decision to cooperate and invest in the
game.
Ermisch et al. (2009) develop and provide rationales for a modified version of the classic
trust game by Berg et al. [22, 31]. Among other things the authors argue that the binary nature
of their modified game, i.e., truster as well as trustee have only two behavioral options namely
keeping vs. sending money, clarifies for both truster and trustee what can be regarded as coop-
erative trustworthy behavior in that situation. Their modified version of the trust game is then
integrated into a survey using the strategy method. This survey is fielded among persons living
in the UK (N ~ 254) and generalized trust is measured with the most-people question: “Do
you think that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be careful enough in dealing with
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people?” However, interestingly the authors also measure situational trust as a probabilistic
expectation. They do so because they assume that the expectation that the trustee will do X,
framed in terms of a probability is one component that leads to cooperative behavior [22]. The
authors asked a subset of participants (80%) who indicated that they had weighed the chances
of getting their money back after their decision: What did you think your chances of getting
your money back were? While generalized trust has no effect on cooperation, they find that
the person’s expectation of the chances of return is strongly related to their experimental trust
decision [22].
Sapienza et al. (2013) rely on data from students of the University of Chicago (N = 502)
who played a modified version of the classic trust game to measure cooperation which is pre-
ceded by two lotteries and an asset market game [37]. Trust is measured through querying
trusters’ beliefs about the receivers’ behavior for every possible amount sent, using the strategy
method in the game, after the truster took a decision. Furthermore, they ask standard ques-
tions to measure generalized trust around seven days prior to the experiment. Behavioral mea-
sures of risk aversion and other-regarding preferences are collected through two other games.
The study finds that cooperative behavior in the trust game is correlated with the sender’s
expectation of the receiver’s trustworthiness but also with his [risk and other-regarding] pref-
erences [37]. Moreover, the study finds that senders’ expectations are correlated with the
WVS-trust (World Values Survey) question, as well as other attitudinal questions on trust
which suggests that the WVS-question captures the expectation component of the trust game
[37]. In other words, it provides evidence for our suggestion in Section 2 that generalized
expectations (generalized trust) tend to affect specific situational expectations (trust). Impor-
tantly, the authors also explicitly suggest that the best measure of trust as defined by Gambetta
(1988) would be the expectation about the amount returned for large amounts sent, since this
variable is the least contaminated by other considerations [37].
Peysakhovich et a. 2014 study the so-called cooperative phenotype, i.e., whether one can
observe a domain-general tendency towards prosociality reflected in decisions in cooperation
games [38]. The authors collect data on Mechanical Turk (participants living in the U.S.) and
investigate to what extent behavior across different games correlates. They also collect self-
report measures after the experiments and find that cooperators [in the public goods game
and the dictator game] have higher generalized trust than defectors. Thereby, the authors rely
on a modified version of the trust question in the World Values Survey: “How much do you
agree with the statement: ‘Most people can be trusted.’?’ using a 5-point Likert Scale from
‘Completely disagree’ to ‘Completely agree’” that is asked after the experiment. Hence, as in
other studies trust is measured after observing behavior in the game.
While there are several other important studies in this area [39–41], the above selection of
studies is sufficient to deduce a series of insights. First, as suggested in Section 2, the ideal
setup would be to study the trust—behavior link across a wide variety of real-life situations.
The bulk of the literature measures cooperative behavior in very particular situations, namely
economic games (often in the lab) in which individuals exchange money. Besides the role of
sample characteristics [42, 43] one can also debate to what extent it is possible to generalize
from cooperation in this particular setting to cooperation/behavior in other situations. Hence,
finding other useful setups and situations to investigate this link seems worthwhile.
Second, evidence on the trust—behavior link is inconclusive. Since there is a strong varia-
tion in experimental protocols, measures of trust and cooperation, samples etc., it is hard to
discern why this is the case. However, one strong pattern emerges: While findings differ for
measures of generalized trust (e.g., the most-people question), findings are much more consis-
tent for trust, i.e., participants’ situational expectations. We actually contend that one explana-
tion for this mixed evidence lies in the difference between generalized trust and trust and the
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underlying measures used in research. Generalized trust may affect behavior; individuals with
a high level of generalized trust are more likely to cooperate across a wide variety of situations.
However, we would argue that this causal link exists—if at all—because generalized expecta-
tions tend to affect more specific situational expectations. In other words, generalized trust
affects trust. However, the link between (situational) trust and cooperative behavior should be
much stronger, as it is the situational expectation that takes a situation’s parameters into
account, e.g., whether the trustee is a family member or not [26, 29]. Hence, it is not surprising
that measures of situational expectations generally correlate with cooperative behavior. In
other words, trust understood as situational expectation—directed at a particular trustee and a
particular expected behavior—and measured as such is related to the corresponding coopera-
tive behavior. Given the evidence above, it is harder to make the case for generalized trust. In
addition, situational expectations tend to mediate more generalized expectations. Therefore
we focus on the latter in our study.
Third, time matters. It should be a truster’s expectation right before she acts that determines
cooperative behavior in a situation (cf. Section 2). However, in the reviewed studies, the mea-
surement of trust sometimes occurs after the measurement of cooperation; sometimes trust is
measured long before observing behavior. The decision to measure trust after behavior is
defended by suggesting that eliciting beliefs affects the behavior in the experiment [36]. How-
ever, we could turn this argument around and suggest that participants rationalize their behav-
ior post hoc and answer accordingly. If the measurement of trust occurs long before the
measurement of cooperation, the measure probably does not capture the expectation associ-
ated with the actual situation.
To sum up, we assume that it is trust as a specific situational expectation that can (and
should) be measured in the actual situation in which we observe cooperative behavior or not.
Previous evidence suggests that, once we follow this advice, we are likely to uncover that trust
really does matter when it comes to cooperation [7, 37]. This supports our hypothesis that
there is a positive relationship between trust and cooperative behavior. At the same time, this
connection has solely been shown with cooperative behavior in abstract experimental settings,
the standard methodology in previous treatments of the subject. Importantly, a focus on and
measuring trust as specific situational expectations also allows us to avoid vague questions
such as the most-people question that may invite respondents to think of different situations
[17, 37, 44, 45].
Below, we suggest that people’s expectations and behavior when they decide to share (or
not) their data represents a situation in which we can fruitfully investigate the relationship
between trust and cooperative behavior. First, this situation allows us to measure trust/cooper-
ation for a different situation than is practice in empirical research. Second, in this situation
we can measure trust right before measuring cooperation. Third, it allows us to use trust mea-
sures that are specific, e.g., specifically refer to a trustee and a behavior that is expected of the
trustee. Fourth, instead of collecting individuals’ trust self-reports for a large battery of differ-
ent trust measures that may influence each other, we can use a single trust survey question
before observing behavior. Finally, rather than focusing on students solely we can observe
other social strata in this situation as well.
Methodology: Data, measures, and methods
In April 2018, we conducted a web survey among members of the German non-probability
online panel Mingle, operated by Respondi AG (https://www.respondi.com/). On the first
page of the questionnaire, participants were informed that participation in the survey is
voluntary and that the survey results would only be presented in an anonymized manner.
Trust and cooperation
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Participants were free to skip any question of the questionnaire and break-off the survey at any
point. 6088 email invitations were sent to panel members by the online panel provider. 3115
people started the survey. Quotas for gender, age, and smartphone ownership were used based
on the known distribution of these characteristics in Germany; 877 panel members who
started the survey were screened out because of the quotas, and 8 were screened out because
they reported being under the age of 18 or not living in Germany. Out of the 2230 remaining
respondents, 121 broke off the survey (5.4%). 7 respondents had duplicated IDs and their rec-
ords (14) were dropped from the data set. The remaining 2095 respondents completed the
online questionnaire. In our survey we measured both participants’ expectations and partici-
pants’ cooperation in terms of data sharing. We, the university researchers, were the trustee in
this situation. The structure of the survey we developed is depicted in Fig 1.
Participants started with a series of questions on their socio-demographic background and
what kind of electronic devices they owned. We then randomly assigned subjects to groups
that received different types of trust survey questions. Some scholars define trust in terms of a
subjective probability, others do not make this conceptual distinction [5, 37]. From a measure-
ment perspective, measuring trust as a subjective probability may provide both advantages and
disadvantages [17]. For instance, corresponding questions do not contain the term trust,
which may carry slightly different meanings across languages. Evidence also seems to suggest
that probability questions fare better in terms of predicting behavior than the standard ques-
tions used to measure generalized trust [22, 37]. Mirroring this conceptual difference, we used
two different question types. This allowed us to compare the measures themselves but also to
test whether one or the other was more strongly connected to our measure of cooperation.
Hence, Group 1 received standard trust questions, while Group 2 received probability trust
questions, both using a numerically labeled 11-point scale with additional verbal labels at the
endpoints. Standard trust questions were: “On a scale from 0 ‘not at all’ to 10 ‘fully’, how much
do you trust that B will use your personal data for internal purpose only, that is, not share the
data with third parties?” Probability questions were: “On a scale of 0% = ‘event will certainly
not happen’ to 100% = ‘event will certainly happen’, how likely do you think it is that B uses
your personal data for internal purpose only, that is, not share the data with third parties?” B,
the trustee, was replaced with “Google”, “Facebook”, “university researchers”, and “the Federal
Statistical Office”. In our empirical analysis, we both estimated our models by separating the
data for the two different trust questions as well as by pooling the data. Moreover, in each of
the groups, we queried trust in four actors—Google, Facebook, University researchers, Federal
Statistics Office—in a random order to ensure that there are no order effects.
In the original survey there were four treatment arms, in two of which we collected probing
data after querying the trust questions asking respondents why they picked a certain value on
the trust scale (See Fig C in S1 Appendix for the randomization). As argued in Section 2, in the
present study we were interested in measuring respondents’ expectation as unobtrusively as
possible and did not want to artificially inflate any connection to subsequent behavior. Probing
can be regarded as an intervention. It may artificially increase respondents’ mental engage-
ment with our trust measures, which may affect subsequent responses. For instance, probing
may reinforce respondents memory regarding which value they picked on the trust scale and
increase their commitment to this choice. In line with this idea additional analyses seem to
show that probing affects the correlation between our trust questions and our measure of
cooperative behavior (available upon request). Therefore, we discarded the data from the two
groups in which individuals were exposed to probing, which leaves us with a N of 1054.
Tables A and B in S1 Appendix provides summary statistics on some socio-demographic vari-
ables of our sample. The average age was 44.7 and the share of women and men was equally
distributed. See Table M in S1 Appendix for the survey questions used.
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After our trust measures, respondents received the following question to gauge cooperative
behavior (answer categories: yes/no):
We, the researchers at the University of Mannheim, would like to include data from the
social insurance carriers for a randomly selected sample of the survey participants in our
analysis. This includes, for example, additional information on previous periods of employ-
ment or unemployment. We would like to ask you to give your consent for this data to be
linked to the survey data. All data protection regulations are strictly observed during the
analysis, i.e., the results are always anonymous and do not allow any conclusions to be
drawn about your person. Your consent is of course voluntary. You can also revoke it at
any time. Should you be selected, do you agree to the data being linked?
Fig 1. Setup of survey and experiment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220115.g001
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We thus asked respondents to cooperate with us, the researchers, in terms of allowing to
link their survey data to administrative records. Ultimately, respondents who agreed were
informed that they were not selected. While our trust measure asks for “university researchers”
more generally our measure of cooperative behavior asks participants to cooperate with
researchers that come from a particular university. We contemplated using a more specific ref-
erence to Mannheim researchers in the trust question but decided that respondents are
unlikely to differentiate between researchers of different universities.
Finally, we were interested in the extent to which situational trust correlates with general-
ized trust. We thus included the standard measure of generalized trust in the survey after our
measures of situational trust and cooperative behavior: “Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” with a
scale going from 0 “you can’t be too careful” to 10 “most people can be trusted” (cf. European
Social Survey). Section 5 provides further statistics and graphs on the explanatory and outcome
variables.
Empirical results
Normal vs. probability trust questions
While we did not formulate explicit hypotheses, our data allows us to compare normal trust
questions with probability trust questions. Conceptually, the latter are more aligned with cer-
tain trust conceptions. For instance, [37] suggests that trust measured as a probabilistic expec-
tation is best aligned with Gambetta’s classic definition of trust [5]. Both question types may
have particular advantages. For instance, normal questions do not require a notion of proba-
bility that may be challenging for some respondents. Probability questions, on the other hand,
avoid the potentially problematic term trust, which may be understood differently across indi-
viduals [17, 46]. We randomly assigned respondents to these two different question types.
We find that the distributions are almost equal in terms of mean and variance (cf. Fig 2,
Plot b and c). The mean of trust lies at 6.2 (Variance: 7.6) for the subsample that received the
normal question (Group 1) and at 60.3 (Variance: 794.9) for the subsample that received the
probability question (Group 2).
Both the standard version and a bootstrapped version of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
which provides correct coverage even when the distributions being compared are not entirely
continuous, validate this impression [47]. The responses to both questions cluster in the mid-
dle (somewhat less on the normal trust scale), and the same is true for the generalized trust
question (see Fig A in S1 Appendix).
The mean of trust lies at 6.1 for the whole sample that is combining answers to the two dif-
ferent questions (cf. Fig 2, Plot a). Generally, individuals in our sample cover the whole range
of the trust scale. The fact that our specific trust measures do not correlate strongly with gener-
alized trust indicates that the measures tap into a different concept (see Table E in S1 Appen-
dix). Certainly, a much more elaborate setting is needed to test the workings and
comprehension of these two questions against each other. Nonetheless, these results suggest
that researchers may—aligned with their conception of trust—carefully choose one over the
other without too many repercussions. Below, we’ll see that the different question types also
display a similar connection to cooperative behavior.
Fig 2 also shows that a considerable share in our sample displays cooperative behavior, i.e.,
around 71% in our sample agree to let us link their data to more records. This attenuates any
fear that the fact that our study requires participation in the first place may result in less varia-
tion in the outcome.
Trust and cooperation
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The relationship between trust and cooperative behavior
To investigate the relationship between trust an cooperation, we start by estimating a series of
linear probability models (LPM) [48]. Table 1 provides the results. Our outcome variable—
cooperative behavior—is dichotomous, and the coefficients can be interpreted as an increase
in the probability of cooperating per one-unit increase on the 11-point trust scales. We re-
scaled the probability trust questions (0-100) to values from 0 to 10 to make the coefficients
more comparable. Model 1 displays the results for the pooled data (both trust question types),
Model 2 the result for the normal question and Model 3 for the probability question.
Fig 2. Distribution of trust and cooperation.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220115.g002
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The coefficients in Table 1 lie between -0.007 and 0.015; hence they are small. One could
argue that our trust questions are a bit too fine-grained to see effects in our models. However,
if we were to make an extreme comparison between those with a trust value of 0 and those
with a trust value of 10, the difference on our cooperation measure is not large. A move from
trust = 0 to trust = 10 results in an increase of the probability of data sharing by 0.03
(0.0028 × 11) taking the coefficient of Model 1, and of 0.15 (0.0139 × 11) taking the coefficient
of Model 2. In our view, these differences are small given that we compared the most extreme
categories. Additional models in which we add the three covariates female, age, and education
lead to similar results. Standard errors and hypothesis tests are normally invalid, since LPMs’
errors violate assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity [49]. For this reason, we also
provide estimations from logistic regression models in Table C in S1 Appendix. These lead us
to the same conclusions. To sum up, our data does not seem to provide evidence in support of
our hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between trust and cooperative behavior as
measured in our study. We provide various possible explanations of why this is the case in the
conclusion.
As on other scales, responses tend to cluster around the midpoint of trust scales [50, 51]. It
is unclear whether this really represents a problem. It is possible, for instance, that respondents
who don’t know what to answer simply pick the midpoint. Here, we refrain from such specula-
tions but are simply interested in whether excluding midpoint answers changes any of our
results. Models 4-6 have the same setup, only that we excluded respondents from the sample
who picked the midpoint on our trust question(s). As we can see from Table 1, the results do
not change.
Exploring the relationship in subsamples
Above we concluded that there is no relationship between trust and cooperative behavior in
our sample. However, it is possible that certain subsets of our respondents display a stronger
Table 1. Trust and trusting behavior.
Dependent variable:
Cooperative behavior
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Trust researchers 0.003 0.003
(0.01) (0.01)
Trust researchers (normal question) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Trust researchers (prob. question 0-10) −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.69��� 0.62��� 0.76��� 0.69��� 0.61��� 0.75���
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 1,052 513 539 848 415 433
R2 0.0003 0.01 0.002 0.0005 0.01 0.002
Note:
�p<0.05;
��p<0.01;
���p<0.001
Linear probability models.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220115.t001
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connection between their trust levels and subsequent cooperative behavior. For instance, edu-
cation has long been known to affect response behavior, e.g., seems to affect to what extent
respondents differentiate between response alternatives, give don’t know answers, and errone-
ous answers in general [52]. Similarly, we may assume that the more highly educated reflect
more on their responses. As a consequence, there could be a stronger connection between
their response on the trust scale and their subsequent decision to cooperate or not. To test for
the possibility of effects in subgroups we reestimate the models in Table 1 within respondent-
subsets that have lower levels of education (finished secondary school or obtained a Middle
school leaving certificate) and respondent-subsets with higher levels of education (finished
advanced technical college entrance qualification or obtained a higher school Certificate) (For
space reasons we moved the corresponding tables to S1 Appendix; see Tables K and L). How-
ever, we do not find any relevant differences. While there is less of a theoretical imperative we
also re-estimated our models within other subsets as a robustness check, namely male and
female respondents as well as respondents under the age of 30, between 30 and 49 years, and
50 years and older (see Table F, G, H, I and J in S1 Appendix). We do not find any relevant dif-
ferences in those subgroups.
Other factors that determine cooperative data sharing behavior
In addition to trust we collected data on a variety of other variables such as gender, age, educa-
tion, usage of devices, number of social media accounts, and general privacy concern (Table M
in S1 Appendix for question wording). In Table 2 we include those variables in a model
together with trust to gauge whether any of them are related to cooperative behavior in terms
of data-sharing. We focus on M1 in Table 2.
While all other variables seem less relevant, general privacy concern stands out as a predic-
tor of cooperation, i.e., whether respondents agree to letting us link their survey data to admin-
istrative records.
A move from general privacy concern = 0/Not at all concerned to
general privacy concern = 3/Very concerned results in an decrease of the
probability of data sharing by -0.27 (-0.27 × 4). The coefficient size is similar in models M2
and M3. General privacy concern, thus, proves to be an important predictor of data sharing.
Importantly, however, we asked for privacy concern only at the end of our survey. In other
words, the relationship could be inflated because respondents want to be consistent with their
decision beforehand. A problem that is shared by studies that measure trust after observing
cooperation in lab experiments (see above for examples).
Conclusion and discussion
We started with the question Is trust related to cooperation? This question is highly relevant
insofar as the importance and relevance of studying trust is often motivated through its
assumed connection to cooperative behavior [4, 6, 53]. If trust self-reports are not linked to
cooperative behavior, we may wonder what the purpose of studying them is in the first place
[7]. Following previous scholars, we hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between
trust and cooperative behavior. As outlined in Section 2 and based on previous findings
reviewed in Section 3, we assumed that trust—an expectation occurring in and adapted to a
particular situation—predicts cooperative behavior. At the same time, the experimental proto-
cols underlying this evidence display certain issues, which, in turn, may affect the findings.
One issue is that the cooperative behavior that scholars investigate refers to behavior in
abstract experimental settings usually involving strangers which some may regard as distant to
other “real” situations. For our study we identified a situation that would allow us to tackle
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some of the above-mentioned issues and suggested that asking people to share (more) data
represents a situation in which we can measure both trust and cooperative behavior in a real
setting.
We found that there is no relationship between trust and cooperation as measured in our
study. A finding that is robust to the use of two different survey measures namely a normal
trust question and a probability trust question. While scholars have long concluded that attitu-
dinal measures are often only weakly correlated with behavior [54], this is not what we
expected in our case.
In our view, this non-relationship may be rationalized in different ways. These ways, in
turn, provide important lessons for the study of the trust—behavior nexus and open venues
Table 2. Predictors of cooperation.
Dependent variable:
Cooperative behavior
M1 M2 M3
Trust researchers 0.001
(0.01)
Trust researchers (normal question) 0.01
(0.01)
Trust researchers (prob. question 0-10) −0.01
(0.01)
Female −0.05 −0.03 −0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age: 30-49 (ref.:<30) 0.01 −0.06 0.08
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Age: > = 50 (ref.:<30) 0.04 0.01 0.06
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Education: Intermed. certificate (ref. Sec. school) 0.04 −0.04 0.10
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Education: Adv. coll. cert. (ref. Sec. school) −0.003 −0.09 0.07
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Education: High. school. cert. (ref. Sec. school) −0.07 −0.15� 0.001
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Number of devices 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of accounts 0.03� 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
General privacy concern −0.07�� −0.07� −0.06�
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.72��� 0.77��� 0.68���
(0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
Observations 962 466 496
R2 0.03 0.04 0.05
Note:
�p<0.05;
��p<0.01;
���p<0.001
Linear probability models.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220115.t002
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for future research. First, while our study mirrors the ideal setting we describe in Section 3
more closely than previous studies, there are also important differences that may explain the
absence of a relationship. In the ideal setting, we would measure the expectation directly before
observing a person’s (non-)cooperative behavior. In other words, the closer the measurement
time points of trust t1 and cooperation t2, the stronger the link between the two probably is.
We designed our study to minimize this time gap. However, it is still possible that a respon-
dent’s trust does not play a role a few moments later when she considers cooperating. Future
studies should elaborate on the meaning of time and potentially try to further decrease the
time span between measuring the two concepts. Any such discussion should take into account
that measurement usually represents an intervention into a participant’s mind.
Second, in contrast to several previous studies, we tried to minimize the difference between
the trustee in the trust measure (“university researchers”) and in the cooperation measure
(“researchers of the university X”). Previous evidence mostly linked trust in “most people”, to
cooperative behavior with a “stranger” in the lab. Naturally, our setup deviates from the stan-
dard lab games that are about stranger-to-stranger interactions between two people. While we
think that our study is sound in that regard, future studies could explore the effect of varying
trustees on trust and cooperation. Researchers represent a particular group of trustees. Fig B in
S1 Appendix illustrates that trust in other actors such as Google or Facebook is distributed
very differently. Future research should acknowledge that the relationship between trust and
cooperative behavior is potentially linked to who the particular trustee is in the situation and
could attempt to measure and model this variation.
Third, trust is one potential determinant of cooperative behavior—given that the behavior
is based on a conscious thought process. In principle, the fact that we do not find a relationship
could indicate either that trust, measured as the expectation that one’s data is shared with third
parties, does not play a role for the decision to cooperate in our study, i.e., to share more data,
or that there are other considerations that trump any previously held expectations. The fact
that individuals who are concerned about their data (e.g., reflected in low levels of trust) make
no effort to protect their data actively or even give it away voluntarily is also known as the “pri-
vacy paradox” [14]. Future research should attempt to provide a more open exploration of
considerations people make in their decision to cooperate across different situations. There is
a large literature that explores how cooperative behavior in games relates to other concepts
than trust such as altruism, lying aversion, morality, simple decision heuristics and the framing
of the decision situation more general [55–60]. Potentially, decisions to share data are
grounded in simple decision heuristics. Privacy concern correlates with sharing behavior in
our study and potentially individuals that are concerned with their privacy follow a simple
heuristic and avoid any sharing when being asked. We suggest probing respondents after hav-
ing measured their cooperative behavior as to provide further insights into their decision ratio-
nales [55]. Moreover, scholars have used vignette (choice) experiments to test the impact of
different situational characteristics on trust judgments and choices more generally [26, 29].
Recent research in the realm of data sharing also chooses this strategy [61]. A potentially fruit-
ful extension would be to use vignettes (with different information) to prime individuals in
order to induce differences in trust. Subsequently one can test whether the experimentally
induced trust differences cause differences in a measure of cooperative behavior.
Fourth, it is possible that the absence of a link between trust and behavior is related to our
sample. We argued that trust is necessary both to start a cooperative relationship and to sustain
it. While there is considerable variation in our trust measure, the fact that individuals partici-
pate in our survey at all could be regarded as cooperation. It is likely that only individuals with
a certain level of trust participate in surveys, experiments, etc. This selection occurs because
trust itself may affect participation but also because there are other correlates that are linked to
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both trust and participation. Potentially, trust plays a more important role in starting a cooper-
ative relationship than in sustaining it. We can make similar arguments for subsets of our sam-
ple. In principle, it is possible that subgroups exist in which there is a stronger trust—behavior
link. In our view, those arguments require more scrutiny in future research.
Finally, as we move from the study of generalized trust to the study of situational trust and
its relationship to behavior, we would ideally also reassess how these situational expectations
are affected by previous positive or negative experiences. A string of studies investigates the
impact of experiences on generalized trust [62–65]. However, there is less research on the
impact of experiences on more refined expectations of trust, e.g., the expectations held by indi-
viduals that have to maneuver an increasingly complex world where their data is stored, traded
and shared by an increasing number of actors.
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